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C O M M E N T A R I E S
Reply by Moyer:
The foregoing thought-provoking response to my
inaugural IJTMB Research Section editorial takes is-
sue with the way I have conceptualized “reduction-
ism,” and with my position on its role and value in
massage therapy (MT) research. I thank the author,
Dylan Lott, for opening this dialogue, and for giving
me the opportunity to clarify my position.
Reductionism, notes The Oxford Companion to Phi-
losophy, is “one of the most used and abused terms in
the philosophical lexicon,” and so it should probably
come as no surprise that some disagreement has arisen
from my implicit definition. The Oxford Companion
goes on to distinguish three specific types of reduc-
tionism, the most relevant of which, for current
purposes, is “methodological reductionism.” Method-
ological reductionism asserts that,
“in science, ‘small is beautiful.’ Thus the best
scientific strategy is always to attempt expla-
nation in terms of ever more minute entities. It
has undoubtedly been the mark of some of
science’s greatest successes, and not just in
physics”(1).
An application of methodological reductionism to
massage therapy (MT), then, would have investiga-
tors start with an established effect at some “larger”
level, and then attempt to determine a cause of that
effect at the next “smaller” level. For example, MT
reliably makes recipients less anxious, an effect that
could be conceived as occurring at the organismic
level, and it is possible that this organismic-level ef-
fect is largely the result of MT first having an effect
on the organism’s nervous system (which is one of
the organism’s major systems but not, obviously, the
whole organism itself). If that turns out to be true, it
may then be sensible to go to the next “smaller” level:
Which branch of the nervous system is most affected
by MT?
To my mind, this approach is analogous to selecting
the correct power on a microscope equipped with mul-
tiple levels of magnification. It is no use always to use
the most powerful setting—though I admit doing exactly
that when I was a child first learning to use a micro-
scope! Eventually, one learns that the correct approach is
to use a lens that can focus at a level not too far removed
from the level of primary interest, which allows one’s
understanding of the adjacent levels to be refined. This
widely-used reductionistic approach, not just in
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microscopy, but in science generally, has advanced our
knowledge of natural phenomena as much or more than
any other available scientific approach.
I originally asserted that reductionism is often
misunderstood, and I daresay that Lott’s statement,
defining reductionism as “the metaphysical claim
that phenomena at one ‘level’ can be completely
understood by the explanation of phenomena at a
‘lower level,’ “ illustrates one form this misunder-
standing can take. Although I find the word “meta-
physical” to be unnecessary, the truly problematic
word in that statement is “completely.” Its inclu-
sion equates any form of reductionism with what
Dennett has termed “greedy reductionism”—the
notion that all reductionists
want to abandon the principles, theories,
vocabulary, laws of the higher-level sciences,
in favor of the lower level terms. A reductionist
dream, on such a preposterous reading, might
be to write “A Comparison of Keats and
Shelley from the Molecular Point of View” or
“The Role of Oxygen Atoms in Supply-Side
Economics,” or “Explaining the Decisions of
the Rehnquist Court in Terms of Entropy
Fluctuations”(2).
Clearly, the reason that those absurd titles do not
exist is because lower-level phenomena cannot com-
pletely explain higher-level phenomena. If they could,
then the very idea that different levels exist would have
no meaning; if ever one level can be perfectly derived
from another, then conceptually there are not two lev-
els at all—there is only one, and so no need for reduc-
tionism whatsoever. Indeed, the very need for
reductionism arises from the fact that phenomena at
one level cannot completely explain phenomena at the
next level. The reductionistic approach, and the theo-
ries that result from it, form the scaffolding that per-
mit meaningful movement from one level of phenomena
to the next.
It is true that there are some difficulties and weak-
nesses associated with reductionism, which is a point
I did try to make clear in my original editorial. It is
also true that there are antireductionist scientific ap-
proaches in the areas of complexity and emergence,
and in Gestalt psychology, that have the potential to
be applied to MT research. But my original point, and
the point I wish to emphasize here, is that it would be
a mistake to convince oneself, as some do, that MT
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belongs to a category somehow distinct from all the
other complicated natural phenomena that have been
fruitfully researched with reductionistic approaches.
After all, MT cannot possibly be more complicated
and inscrutable than love, can it? And yet, even love
has been thought about, and examined, by reductionis-
tic means that have advanced our understanding of what
love is and how it occurs. Is it fully captured by, say,
Sternberg’s influential triangular theory of love(3)? Well
of course not. It would awfully greedy to ask that of
reductionism.
Christopher A. Moyer, PhD
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